32 ideas
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23708 | Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG] |
23709 | Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23707 | Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23711 | A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23712 | Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23698 | Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23699 | 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23700 | A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23701 | A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23702 | A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23703 | Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23704 | We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
23706 | Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |